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JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, : 
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Appellant, 
vs. : 
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DEPARTMENT OF : 
CORRECTIONS, and THE STATE 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Section 78-2a-3,(2)(f), 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended. This statute provides appellate jurisdiction over all orders 
on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by incarcerated persons. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) provides that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on petitions for 
Appellate Court No. 
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extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving 
a first degree or capital felony. Although the instant case does involve an inmate convicted of 
a first degree felony, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an appeal from the dismissal of a 
habeas corpus petition, in which defendant claimed only that his due process rights were 
violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of Appeals rather than the 
Supreme Court; the latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals of first degree or capital 
felony convictions and appeals in habeas corpus cases where the conviction or sentence is 
challenged. Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons. 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991); also cited in 
State v. Humphrey, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1991). The focus of this appeal is on the denial 
of James Harleston Linden's due process rights by the Board of Pardons. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for consideration by this court upon appeal: 
1. Is it constitutionally permissive for the parole board to set conditions of parole, to 
which the inmate agrees, and then apply the conditions retroactively? 
2. Must the parole board set as a condition of parole a condition that is capable of being 
performed? 
There are not significant issues of fact and therefore the same standard of review applies to 
both issues. 
The standard of review which applies to questions of law based on undisputed fact is 
correctness. State v. Streeter. 900 P.2d 1097,1100-1101 (Ut. App. 1995). In reviewing 
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an appeal from a denial of a habeas corpus petition, the district court's "conclusions of law are 
accorded no deference but are reviewed for correctne^ " Termude v. Cook. 786 P.2d 1341, 
1342 (Utah 1990) (citing Fernandez v. Cook.783 P.2d 547)(Utah 1989); see generally 
Stewart v. State. 830 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Article I, § 7, Declaration of Rights, Utah Constitution 
2. Ut. R. Civ. Proc. § 65(B)(b). 
3. Ut. R. Civ. Proc. § 65(B)(d). 
4. § 77-27-11(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
5. § 77-27-5 (3), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
6. § 78-2a-3(2)(g). 
7. Utah Administrative Code Rule R671-518-1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action is one in habeas corpus by an inmate at the Utah State Prison, James Harleston 
Linden. Mr. Linden is seeking immediate release from the prison because the parole board 
unlawfully terminated his parole. The parole board, in conjunction with Mr. Linden, agreed 
to certain conditions of release. Based upon these conditions, Mr. Linden was released, only 
to subsequently be violated because of a retroactive application of the conditions of parole. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
James Harleston Linden was last paroled from the Utah State Prison on January 27,1998. 
On December 22, 1998, he was arrested for an offense that occurred fourteen years earlier, 
in 1986, in the State of Idaho. He pled guilty to one count of Accessory to Murder in that 
he had knowledge that a murder had been committed but had failed to report it. 
Although the maximum sentence for this crime could have been life imprisonment, Mr. 
Linden received a two year sentence. This was in large part because he had assisted various law 
enforcement agencies in convicting a prisoner of attempting to kill a United States District 
Attorney, a federal judge, a police chief and their families. 
Mr. Linden was extradited to Utah following his release from his Idaho incarceration on 
the 30th day of July, 2000. On October 3, 2000, the Board of Pardons revoked his parole. 
The Idaho offense was held by the parole board to constitute a "new offense", which was 
violative of condition three of the parole agreement between Mr. Linden and the parole board. 
This agreement led to his parole in 1998. Condition three states: 
3. CONDUCT. I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or 
questioned by a peace officer, I will notify my parole agent within 48 hours of the incident. 
On May 14,2001, James Harleston Linden filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the 
Third District Court. That action was dismissed upon motion of the State on October 11, 
2002. 
Mr. Linden appealed the order of dismissal on October 30, 2002. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
James Harleston Linden was convicted on September 19, 1987 of Aggravated Robbery, 
a First Degree Felony, Theft, a Second Degree Felony, and Possession of a Firearm, a Third 
Degree Felony, for crimes committed in Park City, Summit County, Utah. Record, p. 4,15. 
At the time, Mr. Linden was already on parole in California. Because of this, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson ordered the sentences to run concurrent to each other, but 
consecutive to the previous California parole. Mr. Linden's California parole was revoked and 
he returned to California to complete his sentence. Record, p. 4. 
After Mr. Linden was released from his California commitment in 1991, he was transferred 
to the Utah State Prison to serve his sentence of five years to life. Record, p. 4. 
On January 26, 1996, Mr. Linden was released from the Utah State Prison, but 
subsequently violated his parole for a curfew violation and his parole was revoked and he was 
returned to the Utah State Prison. He was again paroled on January 27, 1998. Record, p. 
4. 
Prior to Mr. Linden's release, however, he was required to sign a parole agreement. This 
agreement, entitled "Parole Agreement", is an agreement between the inmate and the prison. 
The first line of the agreement reads, "I agree to be directed and supervised by agents of the 
Utah State Department of Corrections and will abide the following conditions of parole". It 
is signed at the bottom by James H. Linden and a member of the Board of Pardons. The date 
both parties executed the agreement was December 31,1997. Record, p. 106, Addendum B. 
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One of the conditions of parole outlined in the parole agreement was condition three. 
Condition three provided: 
3. CONDUCT. I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or 
questioned by a peace officer, I will notify my parole agent within 48 hours of the incident. 
Record, p. 106, Addendum B. 
As previously indicated, Mr. Linden was released on parole on January 27, 1998. The 
parole was restrictive and included, among other things, an ISP with ankle monitor, a 
requirement that he enter into a conjunctive restructuring program relating to issues of re-
entering society from prison, and curfew restrictions. The curfew restrictions required him 
to maintain a 7:00 p.m. curfew for the first 90 days following release and, if satisfaaorily 
completed, then the curfew was increased to 9:00 p.m. for the next 90 days. If these 
restrictions were adhered to strictly regular parole would follow, without further restriction. 
Record, p. 5, 106. 
Mr. Linden strictly abided by the parole restrictions and he was placed on regular parole. 
Record, p. 5, 14. 
On December 22,1998, he was arrested for an offense relating to a murder that occurred 
in 1986, in Idaho. Record, p.5, 14. 
Pursuant to advice from his Idaho attorney \ Mr. Linden pled guilty to one count of 
1
 "As I stated in my opening paragraph, Mr. Linden's two year sentence came as a 
result of his guilty plea which he made at my recommendation. I felt very strongly then, as 
I do now, that if Mr. Linden had pursued his remedies through a jury trial in the courts of 
Franklin County, he would have placed himself in a very perilous condition. It has been 
my experience that the typical juror in that community is not always able to follow the 
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Accessory to Murder. The underlying basis for the plea was that he had knowledge that a 
felony had been committed but that he had failed to report the same.2 Record p. 9, 
Addendum C. 
Mr. Linden was incarcerated in Idaho, for a crime that occurred in 1986, and he was 
sentenced on August 16, 1999. Record, p.5 
On the 30th day of July, 2000, Mr. Linden was released from his Idaho incarceration and 
immediately extradited to Utah by Utah Adult Probation and Parole. Record, p. 5-6, 14, 
Addendum D. 
The Utah Adult Probation and Parole issued a Probable Cause statement that stated under 
Allegations, "By having committed the offense of Accessory to Murder in the First Degree on 
or about May 2, 1986 in Franklin County, Idaho in violation of condition number three 
of the Parole Agreement55, which was the underpinning of Mr. Linden's revocation. The 
Probable Cause statement was issued on the 31st day of July, 2000. Record, p. 14, Addendum 
intricacies of a case as complex as Mr. Linden's and often are more than willing to overlook 
flaws and holes in the case of the prosecution. Mr. Linden never asked me to "get him off5 
but rather asked that he only be responsible for what he did wrong-in this case not 
reporting the homicide...55. Letter from James C. Souza, Linden's Idaho attorney, Record, 
p. 11-12. 
2
 The maximum sentence for this charge is life imprisonment. In this case, Mr. 
Linden only received a two year fixed sentence. This was in large part because of his 
voluntary cooperation, at great risk to himself, in assisting various law enforcement 
agencies in securing information from a federal prisoner "...with regard to his [the federal 
prisoners] drug operation and his subsequent threats and intended actions...55 against a 
United States District Attorney, a federal District judge, the Chief of Police of Preston, 
Idaho, and their families. Record, p. 5, 9-11. 
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D. 
The Recommendation portion of the Probable Cause statement indicated that "It is the 
recommendation of Region m staff that Linden be given credit for his time served in Idaho 
and granted a Utah parole date as early as feasible. All previously order (sic) special 
conditions should be re-imposed." Record, p. 16, Addendum D. 
A parole board hearing was held on the 3rd day of October, 2000, and the Board of 
Pardons revoked the January 27, 1998 parole. Record, p. 18, Addendum E.. 
The reason for the revocation of parole was "Parole Agreement Violation". Record, p. 18, 
Addendum E. 
The only applicable provision that could have been violated by Mr. Linden in the Parole 
Agreement, and the only provision mentioned in the charging documents, is Condition 
Number Three. Record, p. 106, 14, Addendum D. 
The Board of Pardons ignored the recommendation of Region IH staff that Mr. Linden be 
given credit for his time served in Idaho and be granted a parole date as early as feasible. 
Instead, they re-set parole for July 26, 2005. Record, p. 18, Addendum D and E. 
The Board of Pardons noted in its Rationale for Decision, in the "Other" portion of that 
document, "Offender in prison for a crime which took place 14 years ago. Questions as to 
what concerns are applicable. Has extensive prior hy {history} but seemed to be maintaining 
in the 12 mos. before his arrest.". Record, p. 62, Addendum F. Mr. Linden then filed 
his Petition for Extraordinary Relief, asking the district court to terminate the illegal activity 
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of the Board of Pardons {in that the Parole Board had violated Mr. Linden's parole for a 
condition that was applied retroactively}. Record, p. 7, 39-62, 95-107. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Linden argues that he has been denied due process by the Board of Pardons. 
Specifically, that he and the Board of Pardons agreed, in the December 31, 1997 Parole 
Agreement signed both parties, that Mr. Linden would abide by the conditions set forth 
in that agreement. In return, the Board of Pardons agreed that Mr. Linden would be released 
on parole. Mr. Linden's parole was subsequently revoked for violation of Condition Number 
Three of that agreement. Condition Number Three, in pertinent part, was that Mr. Linden 
was to abide all State, Federal and Municipal laws. When the State of Idaho charged Mr. 
Linden with a crime that occurred in 1986, and he pled guilty and served two years in Idaho, 
his parole was revoked in Utah for violating Condition Number Three of the parole 
agreement. Mr. Linden argues that Board of Pardons should not have revoked his parole on 
the grounds that he did not obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws, because the Idaho 
conviction was based on an event that occurred in 1986. Therefore, it occurred prior to the 
Parole Agreement, and that a retroactive application was violative of his due process rights. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
IT IS VIOLATIVE OF FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS FOR THE PAROLE 
BOARD TO SET CONDITIONS OF PAROLE, TO WHICH THE INMATE 
AGREES, AND THEN APPLY THE CONDITIONS RETROACTIVELY 
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The Board of Pardons contradicted its own rules and procedures by entering into a parole 
agreement with James Harleston Linden and then insuring it was impossible to perform. In 
other words, the agreement was ephemeral and designed to fail. Mr. Linden was doomed the 
moment his signature was inked on the document. He contractually agreed, in good faith, to 
abide by the terms of the contract with the Parole Board, yet his parole was terminated by the 
Board for failing to abide by all State, Federal and Municipal laws, when he was convicted, 
after his release on parole, for a crime that occurred in 1986. Mr. Linden abided by all State, 
Federal and Municipal laws AFTER his release, and there was nothing in his parole agreement 
that stated he would be violated for crimes committed prior to the execution of that 
agreement. The retroactive application of this condition of his parole agreement has denied 
him of his right of basic fairness and due process. 
B. Due process protections apply to parole revocations 
Do due process protections apply to parole revocations, as in the case of Mr. Linden? In 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3), there is no judicial review of Board of 
Pardon's decisions involving parole. That, however, is not the issue before the Court. The 
issue before the Court is whether Mr. Linden maintains a cause of action by his claim that the 
Board of Pardons, in effect, contradicted its own rules and procedures and thus violated his 
right of due process. The lower Court found that it did not, and summarily dismissed Mr. 
Linden's Petition with prejudice. Due process requirements regarding parole revocations, 
however, are recognized both on the federal and state level. 
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On the federal level, due process requirements relating to revocations of parole are found 
in the watershed decisi m of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (Supreme Court of the 
United States, 1973), which extended the finding in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
(U.S. Supreme Court, 1972), of the year before, that due process requirements for revocation 
of parole also apply to probation revocation proceedings. 
The State of Utah has followed the federal lead. [The] mandate of the due process clause 
of Article I, Section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive 
in its application to all activities of state government. Foote v. The Utah Board of Pardons, 
808 P.2d 734, <http://www. versuslaw.com, page 3 (Utah, 1991). For purposes of original 
parole grant hearings at which predicted terms of incarceration are determined, fundamental 
principles of due process under Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution apply. Labrum v. 
Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d902, <http://www. versuslaw.com, page 12, para. 
90 (Utah, 1993). See Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, (Utah 1994), (extending due process 
rights announced in Labrum, to other parole hearings in which inmates5 release dates are fixed 
or extended), Rawlings v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah App. 1994) (although the 
Board exercises unfettered discretion in determining the length of an inmates's sentence, its 
actions must not violate the inmates's constitutional rights). Also, the Utah Supreme Court, 
in Preece v. House. et.al 886 P.2d 508 (1994), determined that judicial review of decisions 
by extraordinary writ are not precluded. 
In Renn v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683-684, (Utah 1995), the 
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Supreme Court of Utah further refined Preece and held that "...where there is a gross and 
flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of fairness are flouted, a court may, 
giving appropriate deference to legislative policy and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the 
Board of Pardons, intervene to correct such abuse by means of an appropriate extraordinary 
writ...55. 
The process by which this matter has come before the court was by extraordinary writ, 
patterned in the habeas corpus mold, under the notion that James Harleston Linden was 
deprived of his right of due process by the parole board. In particular, that Mr. Linden was 
stripped of his liberty because he committed a violation of his parole agreement in which he 
agreed to obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws. It was a gross and flagrant abuse of 
discretion and a denial of fundamental principles of fairness to terminate his parole based on 
a condition that was violated, not prospectively, but in 1986. 
C. The Parole Board is empowered to revoke the parole of inmates 
who violate their conditions of parole 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(1) provides, in pertinent part, 
1. The board may revoke the parole of any person who is found to have violated any 
condition of parole. (Addendum A). 
The Board of Pardons found that Mr. Linden violated condition three of his conditions of 
parole as set forth in the parole agreement. Conditions in the parole agreement are generic 
unless they are delineated as "Special Conditions55. Condition three is as follows: 
3. CONDUCT. I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If arrested, cited or 
questioned by a peace officer, I will notify my parole agent within 48 hours of the 
12 
incident. (Record p. 106, Addendum B). 
The finding by the parole board, however, is not specifically set forth in the finding 
document of the Board of Pardons, except as to stating "Before the Board of Pardons of the 
State of Utah...the above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State 
Board of Pardons on the 3rd day of October, 2000 for: Parole Agreement Violation55. (Record 
p. 18, Addendum E). The only parole agreement violation reference is in the Warrant Request 
& Parole Violation Report, which states: 
Allegations: 
1. By having committed the offense of Accessory to Murder in the First 
Degree on or about May 2, 1986 in Franklin County, Idaho in violation 
of condition number three of the parole agreement. (Emphasis mine). 
(Record p. 18, Addendum B). 
It is clear that the violation that Mr. Linden is alleged to have committed is a violation of 
condition three. Condition three, as discussed previously, is a promise or an agreement (hence 
Parole "Agreement55) by the inmate that he or she, simply, will obey all State, Federal and 
Municipal laws. There is no evidence that Mr. Linden disobeyed any State, Federal or 
Municipal laws. Indeed, even the Board acknowledged in their Rationale for Decision, that 
"Offender in prison for a crime which took place 14 years ago....seemed to be maintaining in 
the 12 mos. before his arrest55. (Record p. 62, Addendum F). 
D. The Parole Board must be held to a standard of accuracy and 
consistency. 
Mr. Linden is entitled to know the precise reason the Utah Board of Pardons revoked his 
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parole. Labrum held that the Board must provide an inmate with "adequate notice to prepare 
for a parole release hearing, and ...copies or a summary of the information in the Board's file 
on which the Board will rely.", Id. at 904 . See also Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and 
Parole, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah 1997). Inherent within that holding is that the inmate needs to 
know the allegation so that he can adequately prepare a defense. The sole allegation in 
evidence is a violation of Condition Number Three of the parole agreement. 
It is anticipated that the State will argue, as it did in the lower court, that Rule R671-518-
1, Utah Adminstrative Code applies. This Rule allows the Board of Pardons to summarily 
revoke an inmate's parole upon verification of a new criminal offense committed by an inmate 
on parole. 
It can be argued that a crime committed in 1986, by any stretch of the imagination, is not 
a "new" criminal offense. The more important and salient argument, however, is that this is 
not the reason that Mr. Linden's parole was revoked. It is nowhere mentioned in any 
documents in evidence before the Court. The sole evidence before the court is the violation 
of the parole agreement, i. e. , Condition Number Three. Further, the very revocation 
document itself states ccParole Agreement Violation". (Addendum E). The Parole Board 
knows why it violated Mr. Linden's parole, and stated it was a violation of his parole 
agreement. If Rule R671-518-1 applied, then we could expect, not a reference to "Parole 
Agreement Violation" but a straightforward statement by the Parole Board that he had 
violated the administrative rule and statutory prohibition of "being charged with a new 
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criminal offense55. The record is silent as to any reference to the administrative rule or the 
statutory prohibition. 
If the State's argument is that this indeed was why Mr. Linden's parole was revoked, where 
is it in the record? Certainly Mr. Linden would have had to have been apprised. Labnim 
requires it. If the Parole Board relied on the administrative rule and statute, and did not 
inform Mr. Linden, he ought to be released on that violation of due process alone. It's a 
matter of simple fairness. 
Fairness is mandated in the parole revocation process. For example, 
This court has expressed the importance of adopting procedures that preserve 
the appearance of fairness and the confidence of inmates in the decision making 
process. The Chief Justice recognized in Morrissey that 'fair treatment in 
parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding 
reactions to arbitrariness. Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 
P.2d902 (Utah, 1993), 1993.Ut.304<http://www.versuslaw.com. page 11, 
para. 82, citing Justice Marhsall5s dissent in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates , 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
The interest of both society and criminal offenders are best served when fairness and 
accuracy are assured at all stages of the sentencing and correctional process. Monson v. 
Carver. 928 P.2d 1017 (Utah, 1996), 1996.UT.16136<http://www.versuslaw.com>, page 
15, para. 73. 
The parole board must be held to a standard of accuracy and fairness. The issue before this 
court is not R671-518-1, but Mr. Linden's alleged violation of Condition Number Three of 
the Parole Agreement. 
E. Violation of Condition Number Three of the Parole Agreement, 
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i.e., that an inmate must obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws, must occur 
subsequent to and not before, the parole 
Mr. Linden was placed on parole January 27,1998. He was convicted of a crime in Idaho 
that occurred in 1986. On this crime, for which he paid by serving to its completion a 
sentence beginning August 16,1999, and concluding July 30,2000, there is no further hold. 
He was then extradited to Utah for violating condition three of his parole agreement. Since 
the probation violations for which probation was revoked occurred before the judgment was 
signed, entered and filed, and since probation cannot be revoked upon the basis of a probation 
violation occurring before the appellant was place on probation, the trial court erred in 
revoking appellant's probation. Littlefield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Crim App., 
1979), cited in Bell v. State of Texas, 656 S. W.2d 502 (1982). Bell also held that probation 
cannot be revoked upon the basis of an offense committed prior to appellant being placed on 
probation. Bell v. State of Texas, 1982.TX.41590 <http://www.versuslaw.com, page 3, 
para. 26. Improper conduct occurring prior to entry of probation order cannot be basis for 
revocation even though this conviction resulting from such conduct occurs while the defendant 
is on probation. Demchak v. State of Florida, 1977.FL.42457 <http:www.versuslaw.com 
page 2, para. 14. To revoke probation for violating federal law, the unlawful conduct must 
occur while on probation. See United States v. Rifen, 634 F.2d at 1144 n.2; United States 
v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1978, both cited in United States of America v. 
Drinkall, 1984.CO8.40088,<http://www.versuslaw.com, page 3, para. 21 (1984). 
It appears, then, that an act by a party on probation that occurred before the probation 
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began, cannot be utilized to revoke probation. 3 Although as a matter of fundamental 
fairness and due process it would appear that this should apply to parole violation as well, has 
the court extended probation issues to parole issues? It has. Due process requirements 
relating to revocation of parole are found in the previously referenced Gagnon v. Scarpelli 
decision. As previously indicated, this case amplified the finding in Morrissey v. Brewer. 
408 U.S. 471, (U.S. Supreme Court), 1972), which held that due process requirements for 
revocation of parole also apply to probation revocation proceedings. Lastly, the Utah Court 
3
 Judge Livingston apparently struggled with the fairness of applying pre-parole 
conduct to violate parole, when he stated in the October 23, 2001 motion hearing, CCI think 
that it's really a legal issue of was it permissible to consider pre-parole conduct in violating 
parole when that conduct had not yet been adjudicated. And I think it's a fairly narrow 
legal issue in whether I think their judgment as wisely exercised or not, I don't think is a 
player and Fve intentionally tried not to be emotionally involved in the fairness issue of, 
you know, is Mr. Linden, you know, kind of getting shafted in the sense that it isn't fair 
vis-a-vis what others might have had for similar kinds of things...does the Board of Pardons 
have the legal authority to revoke parole...when the conduct constituting the parole 
violation occurs prior to the, to the setting of parole, with the caveat that it was not yet 
adjudicated. 
...I can't imagine how in that situation the Board would have the prerogative of 
revoking parole on fully adjudicated matters...". Record, p. 134, Transcript, p. 7, lines 14-
25 and p. 8, lines 1-17. 
This remained troublesome to Judge Livingston in the September 26, 2002 hearing, in 
which he stated "...I believe Mr. Linden's petition and Mr. Morrison's position on the 
petition is done in good faith and is, expresses a legitimate concern of the fundamental 
fairness of violating parole, revoking parole based on conduct that essentially occurs prior 
to the granting of the parole. There is just, it is troublesome, I guess would be a fair 
way of putting that". (Emphasis mine). Record, p. 135, Transcript of Motion Hearing 
on 9-26-02, p. 4, lines 2-8. Nevertheless, the Court went on to state that after carefully 
reviewing the legal authority of the Attorney General's office, that "It's within their 
jurisdiction and authority, indeed, to make that exact decision and I believe it would be 
inappropriate and not consistent with my oath to follow the law to grant the relief sought". 
Id, Transcript, p. 4, lines 13-16. 
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of Appeals in Labrum, stated, as to due process rights, "Because of the critical nature of the 
[parole] Board's decision, these [constitutional] rights apply in parole hearings...". Labrum, 
870 P.2d at 909. 
F. A condition of parole must be capable of being performed 
Since parole is a matter of grace and not of right, the State may condition continuance of 
parole on the parolee's compliance with certain prescribed conditions. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 478. 
Such conditions may restrict the parolee's conduct and activities "substantially beyond the 
ordinary restrictions imposed by law on an individual citizen,", Id., so long as they are not 
illegal or unrelated to rehabilitative purpose, or impossible to perform. (Italics mine). Arciniaga 
v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971), cited in Patuxent Institution Board of Review v. 
Hancock, 1993.MD.40309,<http.versuslaw.com, p.9, paras. 57-58). 
Mr. Linden would find, as anyone else in his position would find, that it is impossible to 
perform a condition of parole requiring him to obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws that 
predated his date of parole, which was January 27, 1998. 
It is disingenuous to suggest that somehow Mr. Linden ought to have confessed to every 
crime he committed prior to his parole release, to insure he would be in compliance with this 
condition. There isn't a special dispensation given to the parole board that allows them to 
dispense with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, either. 
When the lower court dismissed Mr. Linden's petition, it essentially conceded the authority 
18 
of the parole board to do this very thing. See footnote 3. This belies common sense. 
Is an inmate required to confess his every criminal act in order to achieve parole? Does this 
include all offenses? Infractions? Just felonies? Speeding? How far back do we go? Ten 
years? To the prior parole date? Thirteen years, as in the present case of Mr. Linden? 
If this "telling all55 requirement is truly required by the parole board, and failure to do this 
constitutes a kind of obstruction of justice, it needs to specifically be set forth in the conditions 
of parole. Mr. Linden was entitled to know the conditions of his parole in order that he be 
able to protect his liberty interest in remaining free, once he was actually released. Patuxent, 
at p.7, para. 9. Indeed, there is a "Special Conditions55 section, which is paragraph 12, that is 
ideally designed to accomplish this purpose. It would be a simple matter to put in Special 
Conditions the requirement that the inmate own up to whatever misdeeds the parole board 
feels are necessary to be disclosed. In the present case, none of these Special C conditions 
requirement this, nor, it is argued, could they ever be, if they were to pass constitutional 
muster. 
As to the core issue that a condition of parole must be capable of being performed, the 
court should adopt the holding in Patuxent Institution Board of Review v. Clarence T. 
Hancock. 329 Md. 556, 620 A.2d 917 (Maryland, 1993)(previously cited). The issues are 
virtually identical and the facts fairly close. 
In Patuxent, the defendant was convicted in 1976 of murder, attempted murder, and 
assault and battery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, plus thirty-five years. In 1987, 
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he was recommended for parole. One of the conditions of parole was General Condition 
Number Three. This condition required that "the parolee shall not commit any act which 
would be a violation of any Federal, State law or Municipal ordinance; and shall conform to 
all rules of conduct imposed upon him by the Patuxent Institution or authorized 
representative.55 This condition is very similar to Parole Agreement Condition Number Three 
signed by Mr. Linden and the Board of Pardons. (See p. 13 of this brief, also Addendum B). 
The Patuxent Institution ultimately violated the inmate's parole on the grounds that during 
his last year to the institution, he refused to fully participate in program services vital to his 
rehabilitation. This was argued by the Patuxent Institution that his refusal constituted a 
nonconformity with condition three in that the inmate didn't follow the rules imposed on him 
by Patuxent. 
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the parole board and held that "revocation of 
appellant parole, based on conditions that appellant was not made aware of until the moment 
his parole was revoked, is a violation of appellants due process rights under Article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.55 The inmate was ordered released immediately. Theholdingof the Court of 
Special Appeals was appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the lower Court's decision and went to some length exploring the very issue before the 
court. They held as follows: 
"...noncompliance [of a parole condition] must occur when the offender is on parole.55 
Id, at p. 10, para.59. (Emphasis mine). 
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Further, 
"We held...that prob^ion revocation proceedings may be pursued and may be held after 
the probationary period has expired so long as the act constituting a violation of probation 
occurred during the probationary period (p. 10, para. 62, cited State v. Miller, 289 Maryland 
443 (1981) at 446. "Revocation of probation, in other words, must be based on conduct 
occurring subsequent to the grant of probation, but prior to its expiration. Patuxent, p. 10, 
para. 62). 
As to the issue of whether an inmate is entided to know of the alleged violation, Patuxent 
held that "When violation of a condition of parole is alleged, the parolee must be aware that 
the conduct constituting the violation is prohibited by a condition of parole." (Underlining 
mine). Id, at 930). 
CONCLUSION 
James Harleston Linden was paroled from the Utah State Prison January 27, 1998. 
Among other conditions of parole he was not to violate any State, Federal or Municipal laws. 
He abided by all the conditions of his parole. Although he was subsequently convicted of a 
crime that occurred in Idaho 13 years previously, he served his sentence fully and was released. 
He has not committed any other crimes since 1986. Following his sentence in Idaho he was 
immediately extradited to Utah on a charge that the commission of the crime in Idaho 
constituted a violation of condition number three of his parole agreement. 
Although Mr. Linden has committed no crimes since 1986, the parole board held that his 
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Idaho conviction violated the terms of his parole agreement, and his parole was terminated. 
There were no conditions in the parole agreement that required Mr. Linden to reveal his 
participation or commission in any prior crimes prior to his 1998 parole release. The law is 
clear that an inmate must be informed, in an unequivocal fashion, what the conditions of 
parole are to that he may have a fair opportunity to abide by those conditions. Anything less 
is an absolute denial of due process. 
It is equally clear that violations of parole must occur prospectively. Retroactive violations, 
as in the instant case, are constitutionally adrift. Thus, although the [parole] Board exercises 
unfettered discretion in determining the length of an inmate's sentence, its actions must not 
violate the inmate's constitutional rights. Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
There is overwhelming evidence that the Board of Pardons has denied Mr. Linden due 
process, resulting in a revocation of his parole. The Third District Court order should be 
reversed and Mr. Linden should be ordered released. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2003. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, LLC 
' Grant W. P. Morrison 
Attorney for Petitioner/ 
Appellant 
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523 JUDICIAL mi>K 78-2a-3 
of fingerprints for the purpose of conducting a national crimi-
nal history background check. 
(2) Fingerprints of applicants for admission to the Utah 
State Bar shall be submitted to the Department of Public 
Safety, Bureau of Criminal Identification to be used to conduct 
a criminal history background check and to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to obtain a national criminal history 
background check. 
(3) The criminal history background information obtained 
from the Department of Public Safety and the national crimi-
nal history background information obtained from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation pursuant to this section may be used 
by the Utah State Bar to determine an applicant's character, 
fitness, and suitability for admission to the Utah State Bar. 
2001 
78-2-5. Repea led . 198S 
78-2-6. Appe l l a t e c o u r t a d m i n i s t r a t o r . 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. R e p e a l e d . 1986 
78-2-7.5. Se rv i ce of sheriff to c o u r t . 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repea l ed . 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l. C r e a t i o n — Seal . 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms —- F u n c t i o n s 
F i l ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel". The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the, 
Supreme Court. 
0J) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only mid by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
15 A D M I N I S T R A T I O N R671-521-1 
issue. Upon conclusion of all evidence, the person 
presiding may allow each party a brief closing argu-
ment. 
R671-517-8. Recommendation. 
After closing arguments, the person presiding may 
Lell the parolee his or her recommendation. However, 
the person presiding shall inform the parolee that the 
recommendation does not bind the Board, which 
nakes its decision by majority vote of all Board 
nembers. 
References: 77-27-5, 77-27-9, 77-27-11. 
History: 21614, NEW, 01701/99; 21703, NSC, 
)l/01/99. 
1671-518. Conduct of Proceedings 
When a Criminal Charge Results in 
Conviction. 
1671-518-1. Conduct of Proceedings When a Crimi-
nal Charge Results in Conviction. 
1671-518-1. Conduct of Proceedings When a 
Criminal Charge Results in Conviction. 
If a parolee has been charged with a new criminal 
[Tense, which is also the basis for revocation, and the 
arolee is convicted of a criminal charge, the Board 
lay revoke parole upon receipt of verification of 
mviction. The Board need not hold a parole revoca-
on or evidentiary hearing even if the parolee contin-
es to deny guilt. It is sufficient that a trial court has 
ljudicated guilt. However, the Board may schedule a 
fecial appearance hearing or parole rehearing if it 
ishes to ask questions of the parolee or a victim asks 
t give testimony. The Board may revoke parole and 
(incarcerate even if the criminal trial court or appel-
te court has granted a Certificate of Probable Cause 
the criminal matter. After a conviction of guilt and 
vocation of parole, the Board may then place the 
irolee on a hearing calendar. 
References: 77-27-5, 77-27-9, 77-27-11. 
History: 21615, NEW, 01/01/99. 
671-519. Conduct of Proceedings 
When Criminal Charge Results in 
Acquittal. 
171-519-1. Conduct of Proceedings When Criminal 
Charge Results in Acquittal. 
171-519-2. Evidence Explanation. 
71-519-3. Personal Appearance. 
•71-519-1. Conduct of Proceedings When 
Criminal Charge Results in Acquittal. 
f the basis for revocation proceeding is a criminal 
irge in which the parolee was acquitted, the parole 
int or representative of the Department of Correc-
ns may submit as its sole evidence the transcript 
m the criminal trial. If the parolee believes submis-
n on the transcript is insufficient, the parolee shall 
arm the Board of any objection and provide a 
ionale for the objection. Nevertheless, a trial at 
ich the parolee was represented by counsel is 
sumed sufficient for the hearing officer to deter-
le by a preponderance of the evidence whether 
ole was violated. 
R671-519-2. Evidence Explanation. 
Both parties may file memoranda explaining how 
the evidence provided at the trial either did, or did 
not, provide sufficient evidence, under a preponder-
ance standard, for finding a parole violation. 
R671-519-3. Personal Appearance. 
A personal appearance hearing is not required un-
der this rule for purposes of arguing the evidence. 
However, if, after reviewing the transcripts and 
memoranda, the hearing officer concludes that parole 
has been violated, a personal appearance hearing may 
be held for purposes of taking mitigation and aggra-
vation evidence in determining disposition and listen-
ing to any victim comments. 
References: 77-27-5, 77-27-9, 77-27-11. 
History: 21616, NEW, 01/01/99. 
R671-520. Treatment of Confidential 
Testimony. 
R671-520-1. Treatment of Confidential Testimony. 
R671-520-1. Treatment of Confidential Testi-
mony. 
Confidential testimony shall be admitted at an 
evidentiary hearing on an alleged parole violation 
under the following three-part procedure: 
1. The State shall make a specific, written prelimi-
nary showing of good cause for the testimony to be 
received in camera. 
2. Upon a finding of just cause for confidentiality, 
the Board shall conduct an in camera inspection of the 
witness, the proffered testimony, and any supporting 
testimony to determine: 
a. the credibility and veracity of the witness; 
b. the overall reliability of the witness itself; and 
c. that keeping the information confidential will not 
substantially impair the parolee's due process rights 
to notice of the evidence or to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. 
If the Board is satisfied with these three aspects, it 
shall receive the testimony and give it whatever 
weight it considers appropriate. An electronic record 
shall be made of this in camera proceeding. 
3. A summary of the testimony taken in camera 
shall be prepared for disclosure to the parolee, inform-
ing the parolee of the general nature of the testimony 
received in camera but without defeating the good 
cause found by the Board for treating the information 
confidentially. This summary shall be presented on 
the record at the public evidentiary hearing and the 
parolee shall be given an opportunity to respond. 
References: 77-27-5, 77-27-9, 77-27-11. 
History: 21617, NEW, 01/01/99. 
R671-521. Alternatives to Re-Incar-
ceration of Parolees. 
R671-521-1. Alternatives to Re-Incarceration of Pa-
rolees. 
R671-521-2. Considerations. 
R671-521-3. Release Before Adjudication. 
R671-521-4. Re-parole. 
R671-521-1. Alternatives to Re-Incarceration of 
Parolees. 
The Board may pursue alternatives other than 
Art. 1, k 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
CJ .S . — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil riphta activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms ior security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1HIMJ, L 1DH4 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes haws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2f proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
CJ .S . —- 16A CJ.S. Constitutional 1 nw 
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2. 
t.L.R. Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 82; 
Weapons «=-• 1 3, 6 P! »ttq 
Sec. J, {Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
64 
253 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an 
injunction bond should be limited only to the 
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result 
of the wrongfully issued injunction. Beard v. 
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968 lUtah Ct. App. 1987). 
Showing by party sought to be enjoined. 
—Operation of nuisance . 
A defendant who wants to operate a plant 
which has been declared to be a nuisance is 
required to offer evidence to the court as to how 
the plant can be used without creating a nui-
sance before he can complain that the court did 
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper 
v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 
P.2d 360 (1952). 
Wrongful injunction. 
—Attorney's fees. 
When at torneys ices are incurred in defend-
ing against wrongfully obtained injunctive re-
lief and also against an underlying lawsuit, it is 
appropriate to determine the amount of the 
total fees attributable to resisting the injunc-
tion. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Under this rule, a party is entitled to recover 
only those attorney fees that would not have 
been incurred but for the application for, and 
issuance of, the preliminary injunction. Fees 
that would have been incurred anyway, in the 
course of proving the party's entitlement to 
judgment and refuting the opposing party's 
defenses, are not recoverable. Tholen v. Sandy 
City, 849 P.2d 592 < Utah Ct. App.). cert, denied, 
860 P2d 943 (Utah 1993». 
Defendant was entitled to those attorney foe^ 
and costs it incurred in defending against 
wrongfully obtained injunctive relief, because it 
collaterallv attacked the wrongful order when 
it resisted the order's continuance as a prelim-
inary injunction. However, defendant should 
not be awarded any i'eos that it would have 
incurred in litigating the underlying case, even 
if those fees were incurred in defendant's effort 
to show that plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on 
the merits of the underlying claim. IKON Office 
Solutions, Inc. v. Crook, 2000 UT App 217, 6 
P.3d 1143. 
—Measure of damages . 
The correct measure of damages is the reduc-
tion or diminution in the value of the property 
during the period of restraint. If the value of 
the property did not diminish during that pe-
riod, any measure of damages other than a 
comparison of the fair market value of the 
property before and after the injunction would 
be incorrect. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Noncompl iance wi th rule. 
A temporary restraining order that failed to 
define the injury and state why it was irrepa-
rable, containing instead mere conclusory 
statements, and that failed to list the reasons 
for extending the order, was improperly 
granted. Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 
P.2d 990 (Utah 1993). 
— N o s h o w i n g of l ikel ihood of succes s . 
Where the plaintiff had failed to show that 
there was a substantial likelihood of its prevail-
ing on the merits of its claim against a former 
salesman for misappropriation of trade secrets, 
the trial court erred in granting a preliminary 
injunction against the defendant. Water & En-
ergy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 1999 UT 16, 
974 P2d 821. 
Cited in Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 
972 P.2d411 (Utah 1998). 
COLL-VTKKAL RKKEKENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. »Jur. 2d Injunctions 
§§ 10. 14. 4S to 52. 69 el seq.. 2(55. 296 to 303. 
310 to 316. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S.. Injunctions $$ S. 16. 22 to 
24, 36 et seq.: 43A C.J.S. Injunctions $$ 165. 
166, 180. 206. 20S. 
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, en-
forceability ot covenant not to compete in, 17 
A.L.R.3d Sb'3. 
Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
conviction. 33 A.L.R.3d 448. 
Review other than by appeal or writ of error, 
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject 
to,33A.L.R.3d589. 
Propriety of permanently enjoining one 
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from 
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in 
question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572. 
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver-
sion of water by municipal corporation or public 
utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426. 
Preliminary mandatory injunction to pre-
vent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting prac-
tices, 49 A.L.R.3d 1239. 
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying 
refusal to honor, or injunction against honor-
ing, letter of credit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2), 
25 A.L.R.4th 239. 
Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful 
issuance of injunction as limited to amount of 
bond, 30 A.L.R.4th 273. 
Right of employee to injunction preventing 
employer from exposing employee to tobacco 
smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480. 
Propriety of federal court injunction against 
suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 831. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on 
any of the grounds set forth in paragraph tb> (involving wrongful restraint on 
Rule 65B UTAH LCLKSOK CIVIL PKOCKIH'UK ur>4 
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for 
instances governed by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule 
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary 
relief shall be governed by the procedures sot forth elsewhere in these1 rules, 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this 
paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition 
with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained 
or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a 
short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks 
relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is 
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the 
petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief 
in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal 
process available to the petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner 
shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner 
in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in 
a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent 
to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing 
the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this 
conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The 
order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous 
on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the 
petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the 
same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or 
otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the respon-
dent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the 
legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the 
respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether 
the person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, 
the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporary relief If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained 
will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury 
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue 
a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be 
dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court 
may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such 
other persons as may be appropriate. 
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(8) Alternative service of the hearing order: If the respondent cannot be 
found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process 
issued by the court may be served on the person having custody in the manner 
and with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the 
action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the 
person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts 
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall 
immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring 
the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a 
hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render 
judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall 
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for 
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring 
before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right 
to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order 
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or 
any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the 
meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and 
when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the 
grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required to be 
represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one 
of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the 
court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held by another or (H) if the attorney general fails to file a petition 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition 
filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by 
an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and 
damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The 
sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether 
civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the 
authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act 
that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a corporation 
in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any 
corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, 
alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has 
forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions 
by board of pardons and parole. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened 
by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for 
relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions 
ha* PYpppded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior 
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required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use 
or enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where 
the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative 
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to 
the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule G5A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1, 199G.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule 
represents a complete reorganization of the 
former rule. This rule also revises parts of the 
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and 
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies gen-
erally to proceedings that arc necessitated by 
the absence of another plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the court. After the rule's 
introductory paragraph, each subsequent para-
graph is intended to deal with a separate type 
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals 
with proceedings involving wrongful restraint 
on personal liberty other than those governed 
by Rule 65C; paragraph (c) deals with proceed-
ings involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority; and paragraph (d^ deals 
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of 
judicial authority or the failure to exercise such 
authority. Paragraph (d) also deals with peti-
tions challenging actions by the Board of Par-
dons and Parole and the failure of the Board to 
perform a required act. To the extent that the 
special procedures set forth in these para-
graphs do not cover specific procedural issues 
that arise during a proceeding, the normal 
rules of civil procedure will apply. 
This rule effectively eliminates the concept of 
the "writ" from extraordinary relief procedure. 
In the view of the advisory committee, the 
concept was used inconsistently and confus-
ingly in the former rule, and there was dis-
agreement among judges and lawyers as to 
what it meant in actual practice. The concept 
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing 
order" and "relief" that are more descriptive of 
the procedural reality. 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph governs all 
petitions claiming that a person has been 
wrongfully restrained of personal liberty other 
than those specifically governed by paragraph 
Rule 6 5 C It replaces paragraph (0 of the 
former rule. Paragraph (b) endeavors to sim-
plify the procedure in habeas corpus cases and 
provides for a means of summary dismissal of 
frivolous claims. Thus, if it is apparent to the 
court that the claim is "frivolous on its face", 
the court may issue an order dismissing the 
claim, which terminates the proceeding. Apart 
from this significant change from former prac-
tice, paragraph (b> is patterned after the former 
rule. 
Paragraphs (c) and <d) replace paragraph (b) 
of the former rule. The committees general 
purpose in (halting these paragraphs was to 
simplify and clarify the requirements of the 
preexisting paragraph. 
Paragraph (c). Paragraph (c) replaces para-
graph (b)(1) of the former rule. This paragraph 
deals generally with proceedings for the unlaw-
ful use of public office or corporate franchises. 
As a general matter, the attorney general may 
seek relief on grounds enumerated in the para-
graph. Any other person, including a govern-
mental officer or entity not required to be 
represented by the attorney general, may also 
seek relief under paragraph (c) if the person 
claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held 
by another or if the attorney general fails to file 
a petition under paragraph (c) after receiving 
notice of the person's claim. In allowing appro-
priate governmental entities and officers to 
proceed under this paragraph, the rule elimi-
nates a procedural barrier that previously pre-
vented anyone other than the attorney general 
and "private" persons to seek relief. Although 
the rule removes the procedural barrier, it was 
not intended to modify the substantive rules 
that limit the authority or standing of any 
governmental entity or officer. Nor was the rule 
intended to modify the constitutional or statu-
tory authority of the attorney general. Since 
paragraph tc) provides only a general outline of 
procedures to be used in such proceedings, 
litigants should look to the other rules of civil 
procedure for guidance on specific questions not 
covered by paragraph tc). In proceedings under 
this paragraph and paragraph (d), parties seek-
ing temporary relief in advance of a hearing on 
the merits should comply with the require-
ments of Rule 65A. 
Paragraph id). This paragraph governs rela-
tively unusual proceedings in which the normal 
rules of appellate procedure are inadequate to 
provide ledross for an abuse b\ a court, admin-
istrative agency, or officer exercising judicial or 
administrative functions. This paragraph re-
places subparagraph (2), (.'3) and (4) of para-
graph (b) of the former rule. This paragraph 
allows the court wide discretion in the manner 
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(12) Termination" is the act of an appropnate author-
ity discharging from parole or concluding the sentence of 
impnsonment pnor to the expiration of the sentence 
(13) "Victim" means 
(a) a person against whom the defendant commit-
ted a felony or class A misdemeanor offense, and 
regarding which offense a hearing is held under this 
chapter, or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as 
a result of the offense for which a heanng is held 
under this chapter 1996 
77-27-2. Board of Pardons and Parole — Creation — 
Compensat ion — Funct ions . 
(1) There is created the Board of Pardons and Parole The 
board shall consist of five full-time members and five pro 
tempore members to be appointed by the governor with the 
advice and consent of the Senate as provided in this section 
The members of the board shall be resident citizens of the 
state The governor shall establish salaries for the members of 
the board within the salary range fixed by the Legislature in 
Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer Compensation 
(2) (a) d) The full-time board members shall serve terms of 
five years The terms of the full-time members shall 
be staggered so one board member is appointed for a 
term of five years on March 1 of each year 
(n) The pro tempore members shall serve terms of 
five years The five pro tempore members added b\ 
Subsection (1) shall be appointed to terms that both 
commence on May 1, 1996, and respectively end on 
February 28, 1999, and February 29, 2000 These 
terms are reduced by two and one years respectively 
so that the appointment of one pro tempore member 
expires every year beginning in 1996 Terms previ-
ously set to expire will now expire the last day of 
February of their respective years 
(b) All vacancies occurring on the board for any cause 
shall be filled by the governor with the advice and consent 
of the Senate pursuant to this section for the unexpired 
term of the vacating member 
(c) The governor may at any time remove any member 
of the board for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance 
or malfeasance in office, or for cause upon a hearing 
(d) A member of the board may not hold any other office 
in the government of the United States, this state or any 
other state, or of any county government or municipal 
corporation within a state A member may not engage in 
any occupation or business inconsistent with his duties 
(e) A majority of the board constitutes a quorum for the 
transaction of business, including the holding of hearings 
at any time or any place within or without the state, or for 
the purpose of exercising any duty or authority of the 
board Action taken by a majority of the board regarding 
whether parole, pardon, commutation, termination of 
sentence, or remission of fines or forfeitures may be 
granted or restitution ordered in individual cases is 
deemed the action of the board A majority vote of the five 
full-time members of the board is required for adoption of 
rules or policies of general applicability as provided by 
statute However, a vacancy on the board does not impair 
the right of the remaining board members to exercise any 
duty or authority of the board as long as a majority of the 
board remains 
(f) Any investigation, inquiry, or hearing that the 
board has authonty to undertake or hold may be con-
ducted by any board member or an examiner appointed by 
the board When any of these actions are approved and 
confirmed by the board and filed in its office, they are 
considered to be the action of the board and have the same 
effect as if originally made by the board 
(g) When a full-time board member is absent or in 
other extraordinary circumstances the chair may, as dic-
tated by public interest and efficient administration of the 
board, assign a pro tempore member to act in the place of 
a full-time member Pro tempore members shall receive a 
per diem rate of compensation as established by the 
Di\ ision of Finance and all actual and necessan expenses 
incurred in attending to official business 
(h) The chair mav request staff and administrative 
support as necessary from the Department of Corrections 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), the Commis-
sion on Criminal and Juvenile Justice shall 
(i) recommend five applicants to the governor for 
appointment to the Board of Pardons and Parole, and 
(11) consider applicants' knowledge of the criminal 
justice system, state and federal criminal law.judicial 
procedure, corrections policies and procedures, and 
behavioral sciences 
(b) The procedures and requirements of Subsection 
(3)(a) do not apply if the governor appoints a sitting board 
member to a new term of office 
(4) (a) The board shall appoint an individual to serve as its 
mental health adviser and may appoint other staff neces-
sary to aid it in fulfilling its responsibilities under Title 
77, Chapter 16a, Commitment and Treatment of Mentally 
111 Persons The adviser shall prepare reports and recom-
mendations to the board on all persons adjudicated as 
guilt} and mentally ill, in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 16a 
(b) The mental health adviser shall possess the quali-
fications necessary to carry out the duties imposed by the 
board and ma\ not be employed by the Department of 
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole may review 
outside employment b\ the mental health advisor 
(n) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall develop 
rules governing employment with entities other than 
the board b> the mental health advisor for the pur-
pose of prohibiting a conflict >f interest 
(c) The mental health adviser shall 
(i) act as liaison for the board with the Department 
of Human Services and local mental health authori-
ties 
(n) educate the members of the board regarding 
the needs and special circumstances of mentally ill 
persons in the criminal justice system, 
(in) in cooperation with the Department of Correc-
tions, monitor the status of persons in the pnson who 
have been found guilty and mentally ill, 
dv) monitor the progress of other persons under 
the board's jurisdiction who are mentally ill, 
(v) conduct hearings as necessary in the prepara-
tion of reports and recommendations, and 
(vi) perform other duties as assigned by the board 
77-27-3. Repealed. 1985 
77-27-4. Chairperson and vice chairperson. 
(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the 
board to serve as chairperson and board administrator at the 
governor's pleasure The chairperson may exercise the duties 
and powers, in addition to those established by this chapter* 
necessary for the administration of daily operations of the 
board, including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appoint-
ments, and scheduling of hearings 
(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act 
in the absence of the chairperson iwo 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by 
majority decision when and under what conditions, sub-
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ject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons 
committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor 
cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and ail 
felony cases except treason or impeachment or as other-
wise limited by law, may be released upon parole, par-
doned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct 
hearings. The chair shall appoint members to the panels 
in any combination and in accordance with rules promul-
gated by the board, except in hearings involving commu-
tation and pardons. The chair may participate on any 
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of 
the board may designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or 
restitution remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation 
granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hear-
ing before the board or the board's appointed examiner in 
open session. Any action taken under this subsection 
other than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by 
a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after 
a full hearing before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount 
that does not exceed complete restitution if determined by 
the court in accordance with Section 76-3-201. 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehear-
ings, and parole revocation hearings, timely prior notice 
of the time and place of the hearing shall be given to the 
defendant, the county or district attorney's office respon-
sible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's ar-
rest and conviction, and whenever possible, the victim or 
the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his 
family shall include information provided in Section 77-
27-9.5, and any related rules made by the board under 
that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, par-
dons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, 
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject 
to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the obtain-
ing or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as 
provided in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or 
limitation of the governor's power to grant respite or reprieves 
in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except 
treason or conviction on impeachment. However, respites or 
reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall 
continue or terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may 
commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as provided. 
In the case of conviction for treason, the governor may 
suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then 
either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions 
offenders serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have 
restitution ordered, or have their fines or forfeitures remitted, 
or their sentences commuted or terminated, the board shall 
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to 
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the stan-
dards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any 
parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commuta-
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the 
board shall consider the offense committed by the parolee, the 
parole period as provided in Section 76-3-202, and in accor-
dance with Section 77-27-13. 1996 
77-27-5.3. Mer i t l e s s a n d b a d faith l it igation. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Convicted" means a conviction by entry of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest, and conviction of any crime or offense. 
(b) "Prisoner" means a person who has been convicted 
of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or is being 
held in custody for trial or sentencing. 
(2) In any case filed in state or federal court in which a 
prisoner submits a claim that the court finds to be without 
merit and brought or asserted in bad faith, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole and any county jail administrator may 
consider that finding in any early release decisions concerning 
the prisoner. 1996 
77-27-5.5. Rev iew p r o c e d u r e — Commutation. 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole may consider the 
commutation of a death sentence only to life without parole. 
(2) Only the person who has been sentenced to death or his 
counsel may petition the Board of Pardons and Parole for 
commutation. 
(3) The petition shall be in writing, signed personally by the 
person sentenced to death, and shall include a statement of 
the grounds upon which the petitioner seeks review. 
(4) The state shall be permitted to respond in writing to the 
petition as may be established by board rules. 
(5) The board shall review the petition and determine 
whether the petition presents a substantial issue which has 
not been reviewed in the judicial process. 
(6) The board shall not consider legal issues, including 
constitutional issues, which: 
(a) have been reviewed previously by the courts; 
(b) should have been raised during the judicial process; 
or 
(c) if based on new information, are subject to judicial 
review. 
(7) (a) If the board does not find a substantial issue, the 
board shall deny the hearing to the petitioner. 
(b) If the board finds a substantial issue, the board 
shall conduct a hearing in which the petitioner and the 
state may present evidence and argument as may be 
provided by board rules. 1994 
77-27-6. Payment of r e s t i t u t i o n . 
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the 
release on parole of an inmate who has been sentenced to 
make restitution pursuant to Section 76-3-201 or whom the 
board has ordered to make restitution, and all or a portion of 
restitution is still owing, the board may establish a schedule, 
including both complete and court-ordered restitution, by 
which payment of the restitution shall be made, or order 
compensatory or other service in lieu of or in combination with 
restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled 
offender's performance, the board may consider the factors 
specified in Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution 
and order that a defendant make restitution in an amount not 
to exceed the pecuniary damages to the victim of the offense of 
which the defendant has been convicted, the victim of any 
other criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant to the 
sentencing court, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement, unless 
the board applying the criteria as set forth in Subsection 
76-3-201(4) determines that restitution is inappropriate. 
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(b) The offender is eligible for this program only if he 
(1) has not been convicted of a sexual offense, or 
(n) has not been sentenced pursuant to Section 
76-3-406 
(c) The department shall 
d) promulgate rules in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrate e Rulemaking Act, 
for operation of the p r r^ram, 
(n) adopt and implement internal management 
policies for operation of the program, 
(in) determine whether or not to refer an offender 
into this program within 120 days from the date the 
offender is committed to prison by the sentencing 
court, and 
(IV) make the final recommendation to the board 
regarding the placement of an offender into the 
program 
(d) The department shall not consider credit for time 
served in a county jail awaiting trial or sentencing when 
calculating the 120 day period 
(e) The prosecuting attorney or sentencing court may 
refer an offender for consideration by the department for 
participation in the program 
(f) The board shall determine whether or not to place 
an offender into this program within 30 days of receiving 
the department's recommendation 
(4) This program shall be implemented by the department 
within the existing budget 
(5) During the time the offender is on parole, the depart-
ment shall collect from the offender the monthly supervision 
fee authorized by Section 64-13-21 1996 
77-27-10.5. Special condit ion of parole — Penalty. 
(1) In accordance with Section 77-27-5, the Board of Par-
dons and Parole may release the defendant on parole and as a 
condition of parole, the board may order the defendant to be 
prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any profit or 
benefit generating activity relating to the publication of facts 
or circumstances pertaining to the defendant's involvement in 
the criminal act for which the defendant is convicted 
(2) The order may prohibit the defendant from contracting 
with any person, firm, corporation, partnership, association, 
or other legal entity with respect to the commission and 
reenactment of the defendant's criminal conduct, by way of a 
movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph 
record, radio, or television presentations, live entertainment 
of any kind, or from the expression of the defendant's 
thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding the crimi-
nal conduct 
(3) The board may order that the prohibition includes any 
event undertaken and experienced by the defendant while 
avoiding apprehension from the authorities or while facing 
criminal charges 
(4) The board may order that any action taken by the 
defendant by way of execution of power of attorney, creation of 
corporate entities, or other action to avoid compliance with the 
board's order shall be grounds for revocation of parole as 
provided in Section 77-27-11 
(5) Adult Probation and Parole shall notify the board of any 
alleged violation of the board's order under this section 
(6) The violation of the board's order shall be considered a 
violation of parole 
(7) For purposes of this section 
(a) "convicted" means a conviction by entry of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere, guilty and mentally ill, no 
contest, and conviction of any crime or offense, and 
(b) "defendant" means the convicted defendant, the 
defendant's assignees, and representatives acting on the 
defendant's authority 1997 
77-27-11. R e v o c a t i o n of parole. 
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person who is 
found to have violated any condition of his parole 
(2) (a) If a parolee is detained by the Department of Cor-
rections or a m law enforcement official for a suspected 
\iolation of parole the Department of Corrections shall 
immediateh report the alleged \iolation to the board, by 
means of an incident report, and make anv recommenda 
tion regarding the incident 
(b) No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72 
hours, excluding weekends and holidays, without first 
obtaining a warrant 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based 
upon a certified warrant request to a peace officer or other 
persons authorized to arrest, detain, and return to actual 
custody a parolee, and mav upon arrest or otherwise direct the 
Department of Corrections to determine if there is probable 
cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of 
his parole 
(4) Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be 
further detained or imprisoned again pending a hearing by the 
board or its appointed examiner 
(5) (a) The board or its appointed examiner shall conducts 
hearing on the alleged violation, and the parolee shall 
have written notice of the time and place of the heanng, 
the alleged violation of parole, and a statement of the 
evidence against him 
(b) The board or its appointed examiner shall provide 
the parolee the opportunity 
d) to be present, 
(u) to be heard, 
(m) to present witnesses and documentary evi-
dence, 
(iv) to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allow-
ing the confrontation, and 
(v) to be represented by counsel when the parolee 
is mentally incompetent or pleading not guilty 
(c) If heard by an appointed examiner, the examiner 
shall make a written decision which shall include a 
statement of the facts relied upon by the examiner in 
determining the guilt or innocence of the parolee on the 
alleged violation and a conclusion as to whether the 
alleged violation occurred The appointed examiner shall 
then refer the case to the board for disposition 
(d) Final decisions shall be reached by majority voteof 
the members of the board sitting and the parolee shall be 
promptlv notified in writing of the board's findings and 
decision 
(6) Parolees found to have violated the conditions of parole 
may, at the discretion of the board, be returned to parole, have 
restitution ordered, or be imprisoned again as determined by 
the board, not to exceed the maximum term, or be subject to 
any other conditions the board may impose within its discre 
tion 1W7 
77-27-12. Parole discharge, sentence termination. 
Any person released on parole shall be discharged from 
parole or have his sentence terminated subject to the condi-
tions and limitations contained in Section 76-3-202 1985 
77-27-13. Board of Pardons and Parole — Duties of the 
judiciary, the Department of Corrections, and 
law enforcement — Removal of material from 
files. 
(1) The chief executive officer and employees of each penal 
or correctional institution shall cooperate fully with the board, 
permit board members free access to offenders, and furnish 
the board with pertinent information regarding an offender's 
physical, mental, and social history and his institutional 
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Donald E. Btsnctiard 
ML(Pctt)Haun 
CurtiJ U Ctrner 
Cheryl Hansin 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 




I agree to be directed and supervised by agents of the Utah State Department 
of Corrections and will abide the following conditions of my parole: 
1. RELEASE: On the day of my release from the institution or confinement, 
I will report to ray assigned Parole Agentj unless otherwise approved in 
writing from the parole office• 
2. ABSCONDING: I will not abscond from parole supervision: 
A. Reporting; I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections 
Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence of record and 
will not change my residence without first obtaining permission from 
my parole agent. 
Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of residence, even 
briefly, or any other state to which I am released or transferred 
without prior written permission from my parole agent. 
CONDUCT: I will obey all State, Federal and municipal laws. If 
arrested , cited or questioned by a peace officer, I will notify my 
parole agent within £8 hours of. the incident. 
H05IE VISITS: I will permit visits to my place of residence by agents of 
Adult Probation and Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the 
conditions
 #of my parole. I will not interfere with requirement; i.e. 
having vicious dogs, perimeter security doors, refusing to open the door, 
etc. 
SEARCHES: I will permit agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search 
my person, residence, vehicle or any other property under my controlt 
without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion 
to ensure compliance with the conditions or ray parole• 
WEAPONS: I will not own, possess, have under niy control or in my 
custody any explosives, firearms or dangerous weapons as defined in Utah 
Code Annotated* Section 76-10-501, as amended. 
EMPLOYMENT: Unless otherwise authorized by my parole agent. I will seek, 
obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful full-time employment (32 hours per 
week minimum) as approved by my parole agent. I will notify my parole 
agent of any change in employment within 48 hours. 
ASSOCIATION:, I will not knowingly associate with any person who is 
involved in criminal activity or who has been convicted of a felony, 
without apDroval from my parole agent. 
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS:
 # 1 will submit to test of my breath, body fluids or hair 
to ensure compliance with my parole agreement. 
TRUTHFULNESS; I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all roy 
dealings with Adult Probation and Parole. 
FEES: I wxll pay supervision fees as determined by the Department of 
Corrections. 
PSCIAL CflNDITlONSx I will: 
1 Successfully complete ISP Program. 
2. Successfully complete Electronic Monitoring Program. 
3 Have no contact with Lori Marler, Teresa Hemmett or their 
families. 
4 Pay restitution of $100,000.00 CASE# 1159. 
" Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy, (to address 
substance abuse and cognitive restructuring issues). 
Successfully complete Community Correctional Center. 
read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate 
the conditions of this agreement, the Board of Pardons may revoke ray 





I£ ~3(~41 SIGNED: 
DATE 
2&X3/- 97 WITNESSED "BY 
DATE 
l^C^nf^t/l. fk )\,A*A\JL— USP m^JS^Z3 
AUTHORIZED BY: lUsfL^ BOARD Of PARDONS 
Amended 09/30/1997 
ADDENDUM C 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WHITTIER & SOUZA 
CHARTERED JOHN C. SOUZA TELEPHONE 
^ ^ _ „ . ^ (208)233-6473 
653 East Center, Suite C 
R.M. WHITHER P.O. Box 4048 FAX 
<Rcfired> Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4048 (208> 233-1554 
June 19,2000 
Utah Department of Corrections 
Board of Pardons & Parole 
Murray, UT 
RE: State of Idaho v. James Harlston Linden, Jr. 
Gentlemen: 
I write to you on behalf of my client, James Harlston Linden, Jr. to assist you and provide 
you with an accurate summation of the incidents of which I have knowledge involving Mr. 
Linden as those incidents may effect his eligibility for parole in the State of Utah. 
Mr. Linden was original charged with . Mr. Linden was 
convicted by the District Court in Franklin County, Idaho on September 15,1999 after he pled 
guilty to one count of Accessory to Murder. The basis for this plea, was the fact that Mr. Linden 
had knowledge that a felony had been committed but failed to report the same. A copy of Idaho 
Code § relative to Accessories is attached herto and made a part hereof. Mr. Linden 
showed no reluctance to take responsibility for his actions, or in this case his lack there of with 
regard to the charge of failure to report. The maximum sentence, on the original charge could 
have been life. However, a plea agreement that was approved by both the prosecuting attorney 
and the local law enforcement allowed for a two year fixed sentence with no indeterminte time 
and no parole in Idaho. 
Part of the reason that such a light sentence was acceptable to the State and the law 
enforcement was because Mr. Linden had proven himself to be very helpful during the period of 
his incarceration while he was pending the resolution of his own case. During that period of 
time, Mr. Linden offered his assistance and cooperation, to various law enforcement agencies 
including the following agencies and individuals: 
— United State Attorney Office - State of Montana - U.S.A.D.A. Carl E. 
Rostad (U.S. Department of Justice); 
— United State Attorney's Office, State of Idaho - U.S.A.D.A. Buckley and 
U.S.A.D.A. Monte J. Style (U.S. Department of Justice); 
State of Utah Department of Correction 
Department of Parole and Pardon 
June 20, 2000 
Page 2 
— Federal Bureau of Investigation - Derwyn Berg and Mr. Tom Summers; 
— Idaho Department of Law Enforcement (CIB) - Robert Boone; 
— Bannock County Sheriffs Department and Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
in Pocatello, Idaho; and, 
— Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, Jay R. McKenzie. 
Mr. Linden's cooperation came as a result of his ability to glean information from a 
federal prisoner with regard to his drug operation and his subsequent threats and intended actions 
against U.S. Assistant District Attorney, Kim Lundquist and his family, Federal District Judge B. 
Lynn Winmill and even the family of the City of Preston's Chief of Police, Scott Shaw. Mr. 
Linden confided this information to me, not because he had to, he was already receiving a very 
appealing sentencing deal, but rather because it was without a doubt the right thing to do. Upon 
receipt of the information Mr. Linden provided the following events occurred: 
— Mr. Murillo's threats were relayed to the U.S. Attorney's office in Boise 
and Mr. Linden was interviewed by FBI agent Berg and the head of the 
Marshall's office in the Bannock County Sheriffs office. From his 
statement to FBI agent Bert, a full investigation was put into place that 
later affirmed the statement of information he had provided with regard to 
the threats that Murillo was making. Most particularly was the 
confirmation that the two possible hitmen named by Murillo were very 
real people and without a doubt extremely dangerous with the ability to 
fulfill the threats that Murillo was making. 
*&• 
One of the possible hitmen was a man by the name of Frank A. Smith who 
was due to be released from the Florence Federal Prison in Colorado and 
who had previously worked as an enforcer for Patrick Murillo. 
The other possible hitmen as per Murillo statements was a very close 
friend of his and an ex-Navy Seal by the name of John P. Evan. 
When the investigation was sent out of state to U.S.A.D.A. Carl E. Rostad 
of the District of Montana, Mr. Linden was asked to would wear a 
recording device into the maximum part of the Bannock County Jail 
against the Federal Inmate Patrick R. Murillo in an attempt to get more 
information of the threats he was making as well as more information 
concerning his pending case and Murillo's operations in general. 
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— At this time before the wire operation could be set up by the FBI, Mr. 
Linden was moved out of Bannock County and placed back into Franklin 
County Jail. There was no advance notice of this move provided to me or 
Mr. Linden by the Franklin County Sheriffs Department and it was almost 
six weeks later before he was again transferred back to the Bannock 
County facility and a wire operation could be set up. After being 
transferred back, I did however allow FBI agent Bert to place and tape said 
recording device to my body and I entered the maximum disciplinary pod 
where Mr. Murillo was being housed. After 2.5 hours of being in this 
area, FBI agent Berg has the recording device removed and a written 
statement was taken from Mr. Linden to ensure accuracy should the wire 
monitor have failed. Obviously, because Mr. Linden had been out of the 
facility for over a month, 2.5 hours were not really sufficient to rebuild the 
relationship to the point where the wire would have been the optimum way 
to glean information. However, despite the absence and the risks 
involved, Mr. Linden did wear the wire. 
— From the very beginning, Mr. Linden at all times stayed ready and willing 
to do whatever was asked of him in this whole federal matter. He agreed 
from the start to take a polygraph test, however, FBI agent Berg stated at 
our first interview it wasn't necessary. He further agreed to testify before 
a federal grand jury or in federal court as needed. Additionally he 
provided the CIB a written letter that could of been used against Murillo 
and the co-defendants in this matter. 
— It is, unfortunately, a fact that Mr. Linden's named showed up in a letter 
wrote by Mark Pentrack to his attorney (Freddie). CIB agent Robert 
Boone then stated that he made a mistake by failing to redact Mr. Linden's 
name from this letter before he turned it over to the defendants' attorneys 
in the discovery process. As Mr. Murillo became very much aware of this 
letter, he has a copy showing Mr. Linden as wanting to give full 
cooperation to the U.S.A. District Attorney Kim Lundquist. This action 
subsequently put Mr. Linden and his family in grave danger, yet, to Mr. 
Linden's credit he did not withdraw his cooperation or assistance in any 
respect. 
As I stated in my opening paragraph, Mr. Linden's two year sentence came as a result of 
his guilty plea which he made at my recommendation. I felt very strongly then, as I do now, that 
if Mr. Linden had pursued his remedies through a jury trial in the courts of Franklin County, he 
would have placed himself in a very perilous position. It has been my experience that the typical 
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juror in that community is not always able to follow the intricacies of a case as complex as Mr. 
Linden's and often are more than willing to overlook flaws and holes in the case of the 
prosecution. Mr. Linden never asked me to "get him off' but rather asked that he only be 
responsible for that which he did wrong — in this case not reporting the homicide. Incidentally, I 
think it is important for the board to also realize that this homicide was thirteen years old at the 
time of this trial. 
It is my belief that Mr. Linden can be a productive member of society. I have seen a 
substantial change in his persona since his marriage and the birth of his grandson. I feel that his 
coming forward to assist the authorities shows an inherent strain of goodness that, perhaps, as he 
matures is becoming more prevalent in his being. One can never be sure of this, but I certainly 
feel as if that is the case. I would ask that the Board take his recent actions into consideration. I 
would ask that they provide ever consideration for lenience to Mr. Linden and allow him to be 
reunited with his wife and their family. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Sincerely, 
WHITTIER & SOUZA, Chartered 
John C. Souza 
JCS/ls 
ADDENDUM D 
Warrant Request & Parole Violation Report 
Offender Name: 




REGION 3 - SALT LAKE CITY 
Date Received 










1. By having committed the offense of Accessory to Murder in the First Degree on or 
about May 2,1986 in Franklin County, Idaho in violation of condition number three of 
the Parole Agreement. 
Probable Cause Statement: 
Linden was paroled for the third time on 1/27/98 for Aggravated Robbery, and was without 
violation until 12/22/98, when Linden was arrested by Agent Maxwell with authorities from 
Idaho, California, and the West Valley City Police Department. Idaho authorities had been 
working on an unsolved homicide from 1986 in which Linden was the suspect. Linden was 
extradited to Idaho on 12/31/1998, and has been in their custody since then. On 9/15/00 
Linden was sentenced in the Sixth Judicial District Court of Idaho for, Accessory to Murder in 
the First Degree. Linden was ordered to a fixed and determinate term of 2 years incarceration. 
I provided this information to the Utah Board of Pardons and a warrant was issued on 1/27/98. 
I have previously provided the Board with a copy of the PSI detailing the incident and the J&C 
from the Idaho Court. Linden was released from Idaho custody on 7/30/00. He was shuttled to 
Burley, Idaho and transported from there to the Utah State Prison by AP&P agents. 
Number of paroles: 3 
Comments: 
Number of alternative events: 0 
Comments: 
Custody status: PAROLE 
Pending charges: None. 
USP#: 15373 Warrant Request & Parole Violation Report Page: 2 
Employment: 
The offender was employed at MONTROY SUPPLY, 1649 W 1700 S SUITE 200, SALT 
LAKE CITY UT. He was employed from 06/01/1998 to 12/22/1998, as a SUPERVISOR. 
He was working 40 hours per week earning 9.50 per hour. 
Comments: 
Restitution: Fines: Supervision Fees: 
Order Amount: 100,000.00 Order Amount: .00 Monthly Amount: .00 
Paid to Date: 600.00 Paid to Date: .00 Paid to Date: .00 
Balance Due: 99,400.00 Balance Due: .00 Unpaid Amount: .00 
Last Payment: 11/13/1998 for 100.00 
Living Arrangements: 
Address: IDAHO STATE PRISON 
BOISE, ID 83707 
Phone: 
Mental Health: 
The offender participated in SUBS ABUSE TX- OUTPATIENT through VOC REHAB. He 
began treatment on 02/20/1998 and completed the program on 05/13/1998 with a status of 
SUCCESSFUL COMP. 
Drugs and/or Alcohol: 
A urine sample was requested and collected 12/01/1998 at 12:20. It was tested 12/01/1998 
and tested negative. 
A urine sample was requested and collected 07/02/1998 at 17:38. It was tested 07/02/1998 
and tested negative. 
A urine sample was requested and collected 05/28/1998 at 14:47. It was tested 05/28/1998 
and tested negative. 
Arrest History: 
ARSON CRIMINAL OFFENSES - 3RD FELONY arrested by: 
disposition: 
06/30/1986 AGGRAVATED ROBBERY -1 ST FELONY arrested by: PARK CITY 
PD disposition: PRISON 
06/30/1986 POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON-PERSON NOT PERMITD - 3RD 
FELONY arrested by: PARK CITY PD disposition: PRISON 
06/30/1986 THEFT FROM A PERSON - 2ND FELONY arrested by: PARK CITY PD 
disposition: PRISON 
USP#: 15373 Warrant Request & Parole Violation Report Page: 3 
Aggravating Factors: 
Extensive criminal history of serious offenses. 
Use of dangerous weapons. 
Repeated parole violations. 
Mitigating Factors: 
One year of parole supervision without violations. 
Date the crime was committed on or about May 2,1986. 
Recommendation, including any special conditions: 
It is the recommendation of Region III staff that Linden be given credit for his time served in 
Idaho and granted a Utah parole date as early as feasible. All previously order special 
conditions should be re-imposed. 
Comments: 




supervisor's Signature Date 
Notary: 
ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO, 1857 
Consideration oC the Status of LIMPS tl, James Harleston PRISON NO. 246S3373 
The above-entitled matter cauie on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons ou the 3rd day of October, 2000, for: 
PAROLE AG REEKS II? VIOLATION 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
iaakes the following deci.sioVi and order: 
RESULTS 
Revoke 01/27/1993 parole. Parole 
effective 07/26/2005. Final decision of the 
hearing held on 03/30/2000. 
1 Successfully complete ISP Program if residing in Utah. 
2 Successfully complete Elec. Monit. if residing in Utah. 
3 Have no contact with Lori iiarler, Teresa Haauaett or their 
families. 
4 Pay restitution of $100,000.00 CASE* 1159. 
ilo Crime Sent Case Ho, Judge Expiration 








This decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at 
any tine until actual -relea&tr from -custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
3rd day ot October, 2000, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
oa behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons. 
M. R. Sibbett, Chair&fn 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON £ / o Q / f ) Q FOR \dLs^&J*jj K ^ O o c c 
Hear ing' Date H e a r i n g Typve 
T h e B o a r d of P a r d o n s ' d e c i s i o n i s b a s e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s : 
AGGRAVATING MITIGATING 
OFFENDER'S BACKGROUND 
C r i m i n a l h i s t o r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y u n d e r r e p r e s e n t e d by g u i d e l i n e s 
( i . e . , m o r e t h a h ^ 4 f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n s a n d / o r 8 m i s d e m e a n o r s ) . . 
H i s t o r y of s i m i l a r o f f e n s e s 
P a t t e r n of i n c r e a s i n g l y or d e c r e a s i n g l y s e r i o u s o f f e n s e s 
H i s t o r y of u n s u c c e s s f u l or s u c c e s s f u l s u p e r v i s i o n s 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 
U s e of w e a p o n s or d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s 
D e m o n s t r a t i o n of e x t r e m e c r u e l t y or d e p r a v i t y 
A b u s e of p o s i t i o n of t r u s t , s p e c i a l s k i l l , or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . . . . 
M u l t i p l e i n c i d e n t s a n d / o r v i c t i m s 
P e r s o n a l g a i n r e a p e d f r o m t h e o f f e n s e 
OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE 
M o t i v e ( i n t e n t i o n a l , p r e m e d i t a t e d y_s. i m p u l s i v e , r e a c t i o n a r y ) . 
R o l e ( o r g a n i z e r , l e a d e r vis. f o l l o w e r , m i n i m a l p a r t i c i p a n t ) . . . . 
O b s t r u c t i o n of j u s t i c e VJJ. e a r l y w i t h d r a w a l or s e l f - s u r r e n d e r . 
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS 
E x t e n t of i n j u r y ( p h y s i c a l , e m o t i o n a l , f i n a n c i a l , s o c i a l ) 
R e l a t i v e l y v u l n e r a b l e v i c t i m y_s. a g g r e s s i v e or p r o v o k i n g v i c t i m 
V i c t i m i n p o s i t i o n of a u t h o r i t y o v e r o f f e n d e r 
(%"*) OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS 
V * s .-^uenisil or m i n i m i z a t i o n v s . c o m p l e t e a c c e p t a n c e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
\y^ R e p e a t e d , n u m e r o u s y_s. f i r s t i n c a r c e r a t i o n or p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n 
E x t e n t of r e m o r s e a n d a p p a r e n t m o t i v a t i o n to r e h a b i l i t a t e . . . 
T i m e l i n e s s a n d e x t e n t or e f f o r t s to p a y r e s t i t u t i o n 
P r o g r a m m i n g ( e f f o r t to e n r o l l , n a t u r e of p r o g r a m m i n g ) 
D i s c i p l i n a r y p r o b l e m s or o t h e r d e f i a n c e of a u t h o r i t y 
E m p l o y m e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s ( h i s t o r y , s k i l l s , c u r r e n t j o b , f u t u r e ) . 
E x t e n t of c o m m u n i t y f e a r , c o n d e m n a t i o n 
D e g r e e of m e a n i n g f u l s u p p o r t s y s t e m 
N a t u r e a n d s t a b i l i t y of r e l e a s e p l a n s 
•/f^N U n u s u a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y ( d u e to a g e , h e a l t h , o t h e r ) 
( '^ ) O v e r a l l r e h a b i l i t a t i v e p r o g r e s s a n d p r o m i s e 
N
 ** L e n g t h y h i s t o r y of a l c o h o l / d r u g a b u s e v_&. a p p a r e n t r e h a b i l i t a t i o n 
S u b s t a n t i a l c o n t i n u o u s p e r i o d i n c u s t o d y on o t h e r c h a r g e s . . . 
L i k e l y r e l e a s e tc? d e t a i n e r 
OTHER 
